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CASE COMMENT 
THE QUEST FOR A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: R V GUL [2013] UKSC 64 
Alan Greene
*
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ABSTRACT 
 
The UK Supreme Court judgment in R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 presented a unique 
opportunity for a judicial appraisal of the definition of terrorism contained in section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000. While the applicant was ultimately unsuccessful in their challenge the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the state’s argument that reliance on prosecutorial discretion 
could mitigate certain absurd applications of the section 1 definition of terrorism, e.g. the 
labelling of acts of UK or other military forces as terrorist, has potentially wide-raging 
implications for the UK’s counter-terrorism measures. In addition, the powerful obiter dictum 
arguing in favour of a reform of this definition and a ‘root-and-branch’ review of counter-
terrorism legislation is a strong rebuke of recent high profile misapplications of such powers. 
 
This article summarises the judgment in Gul and critically assesses the potential implications 
that may derive from it. It is argued that Gul questions the current ‘one size fits all’ approach 
to defining terrorism as section 1 of the 2000 Act. It follows that the discretion of various 
decision makers empowered under section 1 of the 2000 Act ought to be curtailed by more 
restrictive legislative provisions. The difficulty, however, is how to refine this definition 
without hampering the apparent ‘operational necessity’ for a broad malleable definition 
which section 1 now provides.  
 
This paper therefore suggests that if the UK is to continue to treat terrorism as an objective 
phenomenon distinct from other crimes, multiple definitions of terrorism of various 
malleability, ought to be provided for in order to ensure this counter-terrorist response 
complies with rule of law standards. Furthermore, R v Gul may provide an additional string 
to the bows of those who question the existence of terrorism as a tangible phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
*
 Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School, alan.greene@durham.ac.uk. I would like to thank the anonymous 
reviewer for useful feedback, and Natasa Mavronicola for her suggestions. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent Supreme Court decision in R v Gul
1
 presented a unique opportunity for the 
definition of terrorism contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (2000 Act) to be 
analysed by the UK courts. The appellant had not himself perpetrated a terrorist attack, but 
had circulated videos portraying and lauding such alleged terrorist attacks. Therefore, 
whether the accused’s actions constituted a terrorist offence was necessarily dependent upon 
whether another person’s actions – in this instance the subject matter contained in the videos 
the accused disseminated – amounted to terrorism under section 1 of the 2000 Act. The case 
highlights legitimate concerns regarding the broad nature of this definition and some of the 
questionable conclusions that can flow from this definition. The Court’s powerful obiter 
dictum arguing in favour of a reform of this definition and a ‘root-and-branch’ review of 
counter-terrorism legislation is laudable; however in attempting an adequate and universal 
definition in law, R v Gul throws up more fundamental questions about the concept of 
terrorism in general.   
A. FACTS AND ISSUES RAISED BY GUL 
The appellant, Mohammed Gul – born in Libya but who lived most of his life in the UK and 
was a British citizen – was convicted under section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (2006 Act) 
for dissemination of terrorist publications and sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment. 
What amounts to ‘terrorist publications’ in section 2 is, however, dependent upon the 
definition of terrorism in section 1 of the 2000 Act; Gul’s case therefore presented the 
                                                 
1
 [2013] UKSC 64. 
3 
 
Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the scope of the ‘very wide’ definition in 
section 1.
2
 
Specifically, Gul had uploaded onto YouTube and a number of other websites videos that 
showed:  
(i) attacks by members of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other proscribed groups on military 
targets in Chechnya, and on the Coalition forces in Iraq and in Afghanistan, (ii) the use of 
improvised explosive devices (“IEDS”) against Coalition forces, (iii) excerpts from 
“martyrdom videos”, and (iv) clips of attacks on civilians, including the 9/11 attack on New 
York. These videos were accompanied by commentaries praising the bravery, and 
martyrdom, of those carrying out the attacks, and encouraging others to emulate them.
3
 
 
The issue to be decided was whether the conduct shown in these videos amounted to terrorist 
acts and, therefore, whether Gul had disseminated (albeit by proxy) ‘terrorist publications’ 
contrary to section 2 of the 2006 Act, ie ‘Does the definition of terrorism in section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 operate so as to include within its scope any or all military attacks by a 
non-state armed group against any or all state or intergovernmental organisation armed forces 
in the context of a non-international armed conflict?’4 
 
It is useful at this stage to set out section 1 of the 2000 Act in its entirety: 
 
1. (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where –  
 (a) the action falls within subsection (2) [outlined below] 
                                                 
2
 ibid at [26]. 
3
 ibid at [2]. 
4
 ibid at [8]. 
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(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a 
section of the public, and 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause. 
 (2) Action falls within this subsection if it –  
 (a) involves serious violence against a person,  
 (b) involves serious damage to property, 
 (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,  
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system. 
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms 
or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. 
  
The appellant’s argument can essentially be summarised as proposing that section 1 should 
be accorded a narrower definition than ‘ordinary language’ would suggest. In making this 
argument, the appellant’s position was based on three separate strands: 
i. The 2000 Act, like the 2006 Act, was intended, at least in part, to give effect to the UK’s 
international treaty obligations and therefore the concept of terrorism in the 2000 Act should 
accord with the concept of terrorism in international law and this does not extend to military 
acts by a non-state armed group against a state or IGO [Inter-governmental Organisation].
5
 
ii. That it would be wrong to read the 2000 and 2006 Acts as criminalising in the UK an act 
abroad, unless that act would be regarded as criminal by international law.
6
 
iii. As a matter of domestic law, as distinct from international law, some qualifications must be 
read into the very wide words of section 1 of the 2000 Act.
7
 
                                                 
5
 ibid at [24]. 
6
 ibid. 
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Arguments (i) and (ii) were therefore based on international law, with argument (iii) 
grounded in domestic law. It is interesting to note at this juncture that no arguments were 
advanced that relied upon the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).
8
 Indeed, no such arguments were made in the Court of 
Appeal either.
9
 
A. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the appellant’s conviction and rejected the 
arguments for a narrower definition of terrorism. The per curiam judgment – delivered by 
Lord Neuberger – takes the above three strands of the appellant’s argument and deals with 
them under two distinct headings: the appellant’s arguments based on domestic law and 
international law respectively. 
B. Domestic law 
The Supreme Court stressed the remarkable breadth of the definition of terrorism in section 1 
of the 2000 Act, stating that:  
 
As a matter of ordinary language, the definition would seem to cover any violence or damage 
to property if it is carried out with a view to influencing a government or IGO in order to 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 ibid. 
8
 ibid at [39]. 
9
 [2012] EWCA Crim 280; [2012] 1 WLR 3432. In R v F [2007] EWCA Crim 243; [2007] QB 960 an argument 
was advanced by the defendant in that case to interpret s 1 in a narrower manner in accordance with HRA 1998, 
s 3. This argument was based on interpreting the meaning of the word ‘government’ in s 1 to apply only to a 
democratic government that respected human rights principles similar to those laid out in the ECHR. The Court 
of Appeal ultimately, however, rejected this interpretation. This case is discussed below at text to n 25 and it 
will be shown that the material issues in R v F did not arise in R v Gul.  
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advance a very wide range of causes. Thus, it would appear to extend to military or quasi-
military activity aimed at bringing down a foreign government, even where that activity is 
approved (officially or unofficially) by the UK government.
10
 
 
The Supreme Court, however, expressly declined to say whether the section 1 definition 
actually went this far.
11
  
 
Attempting to justify the broad definition contained in section 1, the Crown contended that 
this expansiveness was operationally tempered by the requirement (in section 117 of the 2000 
Act) for the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) or if the actions occurred 
abroad the Attorney General before any prosecution could be launched. This discretion, 
according to the Crown, operated as a filtering mechanism that prevented the problematic 
result of labelling certain actions such as British military operations overseas as terrorism.
12
 
The Supreme Court, however, considered such a reliance on prosecutorial discretion 
problematic. First, it risks undermining the rule of law as it is effectively saying that the 
legislature has delegated to an appointee of the executive the decision whether or not to 
classify certain activity as terroristic, and therefore criminal: such decisions, although made 
by an independent lawyer, are neither transparent nor made by democratic representatives.  
This leaves individuals unclear as to whether or not their actions may be classified as 
criminal.
13
 Secondly, the Supreme Court considered that constructing section 1 so as to be 
read in accordance with section 117 would have ‘two further undesirable consequences’: it 
would make the challenging of any executive acts very rare indeed; and irrespective of 
                                                 
10
 ibid at [28]. 
11
 Although see below at p 000 the discussion of the case of R v F. 
12
 n 1 above at [30]. 
13
 ibid at [37]. 
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whether a prosecution arises, as a matter of law an act ought to be identifiable as terroristic 
and therefore criminal at the time it is committed.
14
 Reliance upon prosecutorial discretion on 
this matter was therefore considered to be conceptually problematic given the temporal 
difference between the act occurring and the contemplation of prosecution.
15
 As a result, the 
Supreme Court rejected reliance on prosecutorial discretion, stating that: ‘It may well be that 
any concern which Parliament had about the width of the definition of terrorism in section 
1(1) was mitigated by the existence of the statutory prosecutorial discretion but… we do not 
regard it as an appropriate reason for giving “terrorism” a wide meaning.’16 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that ‘it is difficult to see how the natural, very wide, meaning 
of the definition can properly be cut down by this Court’ as it was ‘indeed intended [by 
Parliament] to be very wide’.17 Consequently, notwithstanding their reservations, the 
Supreme Court justices held that on the arguments based on domestic law, the Court could 
not alter the meaning of section 1 so as to interpret it more narrowly than the natural 
meaning. It also follows that the Supreme Court’s rejection of prosecutorial discretion under 
section 117 tempering the breadth of section 1 had no material impact on the outcome of Gul. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, this finding affects other powers contained in the 
2000 Act which rely on the discretion of decision-makers to temper the application of the 
section 1 definition of terrorism, eg stop and search powers under section 44, and detention 
powers at UK borders and ports under Schedule 7. 
                                                 
14
 ibid. 
15
 See the discussion of inchoate offences below at p 000 for a possible example of this issue arising before the 
courts. 
16
 ibid at [40]. 
17
 ibid at [38]. 
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B. International law  
The arguments relying on international law were based on a number of grounds. The 
appellant argued that, given the lack of international agreement as to whether acts of 
insurgence or freedom fighters in non-international armed conflicts are classified as terrorist, 
and indeed the general understanding that they are not, section 1 of the 2000 Act should be 
interpreted accordingly so as to exclude them. This argument was, however, rejected by the 
Supreme Court finding that any support for this idea ‘falls far short of amounting to a general 
understanding which could be properly invoked as an aid to statutory interpretation’.18   
 
Furthermore, the Court held that it was incorrect to argue that the section 1 definition of 
terrorism should be interpreted narrowly in accordance with international law on the basis 
that the 2000 and 2006 Acts were enacted to give effect to international law obligations, as 
the Court found that there was no internationally agreed definition of terrorism and therefore 
no need to address this issue.
19
 The appellant’s second argument based on international law – 
that as the 2000 and 2006 Acts label as terrorist and therefore criminalise behaviour outside 
of the UK, the meaning of terrorism should not be wider than the accepted international norm 
– was also defeated by this lack of an internationally agreed definition of terrorism.20  
 
The Supreme Court also stated that in any event there was no rule that precluded the UK 
from going further than what is required by international law.
21
 Thus, if a broad definition of 
terrorism, when applied in line with a specific provision, results in a breach of international 
                                                 
18
 ibid at [45]. 
19
 ibid at [57]. 
20
 ibid at [55]-[57]. 
21
 ibid at [53]. 
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law, eg the Geneva Conventions, then the Supreme Court considered that the definition 
would be interpreted more narrowly, but even then only in relation to the specific provision in 
question not its general application.
22
 
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court answered the question – whether the definition of terrorism 
in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 operates so as to include within its scope any or all 
military attacks by a non-state armed group against any or all state or intergovernmental 
organisation armed forces in the context of a non-international armed conflict – in the 
affirmative, and Gul’s conviction was upheld. However, the Supreme Court’s judgment also 
concludes with a strongly worded obiter dictum stressing the need for reform of section 1 of 
the 2000 Act and signalling dissatisfaction with the current UK definition of terrorism.  
 
A. ANALYSIS:  GUL AND REVIEWING THE UK’S DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
B. The status of non-state combatants in non-international armed conflicts 
The principal result of R v Gul is that the section 1 definition of terrorism can ‘criminalise 
certain activities carried out overseas that constitute lawful hostilities under international 
humanitarian law’.23 In addition, this label potentially applies to groups which the UK 
Government supports. Although the Supreme Court in Gul expressly refused to comment on 
this conclusion,
24
 the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v F would suggest that this is the 
case.
25
 In R v F the Court of Appeal upheld the appellant’s conviction under section 58 of the 
2000 Act for possession of a document or record containing information of a kind likely to be 
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. The appellant’s argument – 
                                                 
22
 ibid. 
23
 ibid at [33] quoting D Anderson, ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2011: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the 
Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006’ (London: The Stationery Office, 
2012) at [3.2]. 
24
 ibid at [28]-[29].  
25
 n 9 above.  
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that the definition of terrorism in section 1 didn’t extend to attacks on non-democratic 
governments (ie Libya) – was grounded in an interpretation of the ECHR, and attempted to 
correlate ‘government’ in section 1 of the 2000 Act with a government that respected the 
principles of the ECHR. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this argument and found that 
there could be no ambiguity in the meaning of ‘government’ in section 1, as evidenced by the 
phrase ‘a country other than the United Kingdom’.26 Consequently, even if an individual’s 
target is a state considered as unfriendly by the UK, or a government in possession of 
sovereignty but lacking democratic legitimacy, Gul when read in conjunction with R v F 
suggests that such an individual’s conduct would come under the section 1 definition of 
terrorism. R v F is a decision of the Court of Appeal and therefore not binding on the 
Supreme Court; however, notwithstanding this caveat, it would appear that whether directed 
at the Government of the United Kingdom or that of Syria, whether an unprovoked attack on 
innocent civilians or a reaction to extrajudicial murder by the state, these relevant threats and 
activities constitute terrorism under section 1.
27
 This is somewhat ironic given that counter-
terrorist responses that conflate terrorists with combatants and therefore apply a war 
paradigm – such as the approach taken by the US – were criticised by numerous 
commentators who instead lauded the UK’s approach of treating terrorists as criminals, 
therefore showing their faith in the resilience of the criminal justice system.
28
 Thoughts of the 
opposite results of applying a criminal justice paradigm seem to have been overlooked in the 
literature. This is not to be taken as a criticism of applying a criminal justice paradigm to 
terrorism but instead as a criticism of the broad nature of the current definition of terrorism 
under section 1. The normative value of the criminal justice paradigm is necessarily 
dependent upon an appropriate definition of terrorism.   
 
                                                 
26
 [2007] QB 967 at [26]. 
27
 D. Anderson, ‘Shielding the Compass’ (2013) 3 EHRLR 233, 244. 
28
 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin Books, 2010) 137; D. Cole, ‘The Brits do it Better’ [2008] 
New York Review of Books (12 June) 68; K. Roach, ‘The Case for defining Terrorism with Restraint and without 
Reference to Political or Religious Motive’ in A. Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds), Law and Liberty 
in the War on Terror (New South Wales:  Federation Press, 2007) 42-44. Roach does, however, stress the 
importance of defining terrorism with restraint.  
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At the same time, praise for a criminal justice approach to terrorism is not universal. When 
such a criminal justice model is applied in an over-politicised manner – as facilitated by a 
broad definition of terrorism – its normative value is substantially diminished. The UK’s 
experience of applying a criminal justice model to Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’, for 
example, stands as an example of where the arbitrary and inconsistent labelling or targeting 
of individuals as terrorists resulted in damaging consequences for both the state and its 
citizens. The erosion of procedural rights, the broad use of arrest powers for information 
gathering purposes and the discriminatory use of powers such as internment almost 
exclusively against Catholics polarised community relations further and damaged the police’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the oppressed community.
29
 Northern Ireland also illustrates the 
dangers of incorporating exceptional powers into the ordinary criminal justice system arising 
from the propensity of such measures to become permanent, even when measures such as 
sunset clauses are included to insure their temporariness.
30
 ‘Normalising the exception’ 
                                                 
29
 B. Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2010) 53-61; F.F. Davis, ‘Internment Without Trial; The Lessons from the United 
States, Northern Ireland & Israel’ (August 2004) 15-16 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=575481(last visited 31 
January 2014). See also F.N. Aoláin, ‘The fortification of an Emergency Regime’ (1995-96) 59 Albany LR 
1353; F.N. Aoláín, The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland (Belfast:  
Blackstaff Press, 2000) 41. 
30
 eg the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA 1973) which introduced a new model of 
processing internment and trying those for certain scheduled terrorist offences (Diplock Courts) was amended in 
1978, 1987, 1991 and 1996 before being replaced by the 2000 Act. The 2000 Act re-enacted many provisions of 
the EPA 1973 under Part VII, subject to annual renewal. It could not, however, be renewed after five years (an 
effective sunset clause on the renewal clause). Part VII lapsed on 31 July 2007, ending the 34 year life of the so 
called ‘emergency provisions’. Relatedly, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 which, 
amongst other measures, introduced the offence of being a member of an illegal organisation was initially 
subject to a sunset clause. It was renewed every five years including amendments in 1976, 1984 and 1989. 
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therefore may be just as damaging as ‘exceptionalising the normal’ and a poorly formulated 
definition of what amounts to terrorism may end up doing both. 
 
B. Amending section 1: a narrower definition? 
The definition of terrorism in section 1 ‘permeates the entire legislative structure’31 of the 
state’s counter-terrorist machine. The definition goes beyond the 2000 Act and even the 2006 
Act to affect other acts such as the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, the Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, to name but a 
few. Section 1 has also influenced other states in their respective attempts to legislate to 
confront terrorism.
32
 Given the various different scenarios, offences and powers to which 
section 1 applies to, it is foreseeable that this definition of terrorism would have to be 
substantial in its breadth. 
 
Both the Supreme Court in Gul and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
David Anderson QC suggest that the justification for a legal definition of terrorism in the first 
                                                                                                                                                        
Following the collapse of the IRA ceasefire and the bombing of Canary Wharf in 1996, the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996 (PTA 1996) was enacted which gave the authorities the power to 
declare areas ‘special zones’. Within these ‘special zones’ persons could be subject to body searches even in the 
absence of suspicion. It too was replaced by the Terrorism Act 2000, which applies the provisions therein to the 
whole of the UK, not just Northern Ireland.  See Dickson, ibid 161-165.   
31
 R v F, n 25 above at [13]. 
32
 Kent Roach traces the influence of the definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act on states such as Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and South Africa amongst others: K. Roach, ‘The Post-9/11 Migration of 
Britain’s Terrorism Act 2000’ in S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 374. 
13 
 
instance is for operational matters.
33
 In particular, David Anderson rejects arguments based 
on emotional or political condemnation of terroristic acts, or the status of terrorism as a 
unique threat facing citizens and the state as a whole, as reasons for enacting a legal 
definition of terrorism and introducing additional terrorist offences and special powers to 
confront terrorism. Anderson argues that the operational reasons that justify defining 
terrorism are (i) to ‘defend further up the field’34 and (ii) the reliance on evidence that cannot 
be disclosed that is particularly relevant in counter-terrorist operations.
35
 
 
Despite this apparent ‘operational necessity’ for a broad definition of terrorism, the reliance 
of the Government on prosecutorial discretion in justifying this breadth and tempering its 
implications was explicitly rejected in Gul.
36
 It would follow from Gul that the discretion 
afforded to other decision-makers when applying the definition of terrorism in section 1 can 
also not be taken into account when justifying the breadth of this definition, eg the discretion 
of police officers utilising stop and search powers under section 44 of the 2000 Act or 
detention powers at UK borders and ports under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act. The Court’s 
obiter dictum in Gul again alludes to this: ‘the wide definition of “terrorism” does not only 
give rise to concerns in relation to the very broad prosecutorial discretion bestowed by the 
2000 and 2006 Acts…The two acts also grant substantial intrusive powers to the police and 
                                                 
33
 D. Anderson, ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2012: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006’ (London: The Stationery Office, 2013) at [4.4]. 
34
 Anderson describes as ‘defending further up the field’ preventative measures that seek to detect and interfere 
with the committal of terrorist attacks earlier than previously possible due to the dangers of allowing such a 
‘plot to run’: n 23 above, 243. 
35
 ibid.  
36
 Text to n 16 above. 
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to immigration offices including stop and search, which depend upon what appears to be a 
very broad discretion on their part.’37 
 
The Supreme Court’s obiter rejection of police discretion operating as a buffer to justify stop 
and search powers under section 44 of the 2000 Act complements the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECtHR) approach in Gillan v United Kingdom.38 In Gillan the ECtHR 
sitting in Chamber formation held that ‘stop and search’ powers under section 44 of the 2000 
Act breached Article 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for privacy) as they were not defined 
with sufficient clarity nor subject to appropriate legal safeguards so as to be considered to be 
‘in accordance with the law.’39 In particular, the ECtHR noted the operation of discretion by 
the Home Secretary and senior police officers empowered to authorise such searches, and the 
officers actually conducting the searches.
40
 Thus although Gillan was not expressly 
mentioned in Gul the Supreme Court’s approach in this instance can be seen as in line with 
the ECtHR’s reasoning in Gillan.   
 
Like the ‘stop and search’ powers considered in Gillan, powers exercised by port and airport 
authorities under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act are also tempered by the effective discretion of 
decision-makers. The Supreme Court in Gul expressly flagged Schedule 7 powers for 
                                                 
37
 n 1 above at [63]. 
38
 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom App no 4158/05, Fourth Section Chamber judgment of 12 January 
2010. 
39
 ibid at [87]. 
40
 ibid 41-44.  John Ip terms these two types of discretion as ‘front-end’ and ‘back-end’ discretion respectively: 
see J. Ip, ‘The Reform of Counterterrorism Stop and Search after Gillan v United Kingdom’ [2013] HRLR, 
advanced Access at http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/10/23/hrlr.ngt028.full.pdf+html(last visited 
15 November 2013). 
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attention. Such powers are, according to the Supreme Court, ‘not subject to any controls. 
Indeed, the Officer is not even required to have grounds for suspecting that the person 
concerned falls within section 40(1) of the 2000 Act (i.e. that he has “committed an offence”, 
or he “is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism”)’.41 
 
High profile instances of the controversial use of these operational powers in cases where 
such discretion was applied in a questionable manner are worrying illustrations of the danger 
an overly broad definition of terrorism can pose to the human rights of everybody. The 
detention of David Miranda – the partner of The Guardian newspaper journalist Glenn 
Greenwald who was involved in the publication of information leaked by the whistle-blower 
Edward Snowden – at Heathrow Airport by police under powers contained in Schedule 7 to 
the 2000 Act stands as a tangible example of how this broad definition of terrorism has the 
potential to be abused.
 
Miranda subsequently sought judicial review of his detention with 
arguments  based on domestic law (improper purpose regarding the use of Schedule 7) and 
Article 10 of the ECHR (freedom of expression).
42
 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s reference to 
Schedule 7 in its obiter dictum in Gul is arguably a thinly veiled criticism of the manner in 
                                                 
41
 ibid at [64]. 
42
 David Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 255 (admin); The Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has also sought to establish an independent inquiry regarding Miranda’s 
detention: see D. Anderson, ‘Detention of David Miranda – Announcement of Independent Review’ 
(Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 22 August 2013) at 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/detention-of-david-miranda-announcement-of-
independent-review/(last visited 15 November 2013).  
16 
 
which David Miranda was detained.
43
 Ultimately, however, the High Court unanimously 
rejected Miranda’s arguments and upheld the lawfulness of his detention under Schedule 7.44 
 
Many of the current suggestions for reform of Schedule 7 contained in the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill still, however, rely upon the effective exercise of the 
discretion of decision-makers. Proposals such as requiring an officer empowered under 
Schedule 7 to be appointed by the Secretary of State
45
 and the Secretary of State to issue a 
code of practice about the training of such empowered individuals to facilitate the effective 
operation of such powers
46
 are attempts at improving the operative effect of this discretion by 
increasing the professionalisation and experiential authority of the decision-maker. Gul and 
Gillan would suggest that these reforms are inadequate as they are still reliant upon discretion 
without any clear guidance enshrined in law. The detrimental effect to the rule of law would 
still remain if these changes were enacted. Such reforms therefore rely upon decision-maker 
discretion in order to prevent abuse but do so, light of Gul, by still relying on a procedural 
buffer that does not justify the broad definition of terrorism contained in section 1. Gul 
therefore would imply that proper reform of Schedule 7 would require reform of section 1 of 
                                                 
43
 D. Anderson, ‘Defining Terrorism: A two-tailed Scorpion’ (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 
23 October 2013) at https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/defining-terrorism-a-two-tailed-
scorpion/(last visited 15 November 2013).  
44
 Lord Justice Laws distinguished Miranda’s detention under Schedule 7 from section 44 stop and search 
powers scrutinised in Gillan by agreeing with the High Court’s reasoning in Beghal v DPP [2014] 2 WLR 150 
that Schedule 7 powers are limited to a small category of individuals who present themselves at UK borders. 
This can be contrasted with section 44 stop and search powers which could be exercised in ‘authorised areas’ 
but such authorised areas were ‘not sufficiently circumscribed and lacked adequate legal safeguards’. Miranda v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, n 42 above at [75]-[82]. 
45
 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, Sched 8, para 1(2). 
46
 ibid, Sched 8, para 1(3)(1A).  
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the 2000 Act itself.  The Supreme Court in Gul appears to suggest instead that such reforms 
ought to require that an individual fall within section 40(1) of the 2000 Act, ie that the officer 
has grounds for suspecting the person in question.
47
 The Supreme Court’s suggested reforms 
therefore seek to curtail the discretion of decision-makers in a more legalistic manner than the 
current legislative proposals. 
 
In light of Gul, the solution would surely be somehow to narrow the definition of terrorism 
contained in section 1. This would still be the case even if the Supreme Court’s suggestions 
of reform of Schedule 7 were taken into account – that an officer has grounds to suspect an 
individual – as a poorly worded definition of terrorism is of no guidance in helping the 
formation of such grounds of suspicion.  Such a definition therefore would have to reduce 
reliance on prosecutorial or other decision-maker discretion while still maintaining a 
necessary degree of elasticity to facilitate operational functionality. Such a refinement may 
even be necessary in line with human rights obligations when Gul is read in conjunction with 
Gillan. Of course this is easier said than done. Furthermore, as section 1 ‘defines the word 
that permeates the legislative structure’48 of the state’s counter-terrorist machine it may be 
that this change is almost impossible. In order to realise the rule of law principles emphasised 
by the Supreme Court in Gul, the solution may be to cease the quest for a single definition of 
terrorism altogether and instead provide multiple definitions of varying width according to 
the area of state security or the criminal justice system to which they are applicable. Whether 
a single domestic definition of terrorism – aside from a single international definition of 
terrorism – is achievable or even valuable is therefore questionable as a result of R v Gul.  
Indeed, as stated previously, Gul raises the possibility of the section 1 definition of terrorism 
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being accorded a narrower meaning in particular instances where the broader, generalist, 
meaning would result in a breach of international norms such as the Geneva Convention.
49
 
There is therefore, hypothetically, already a potential variable nature to the single definition 
of terrorism contained in section 1.  
 
An example where a narrower or more clearly delineated definition of terrorism could 
operate would be the novel terrorist inchoate offences introduced into the criminal justice 
system.
50
 With the reliance of inchoate offences in ‘defending further up the field’51 against 
terrorism, a particular conundrum arises that afflicts inchoate offences in general: proving 
intention.
52
 Intention, as in all criminal cases, is inferred circumstantially; however, it is more 
difficult to prove in inchoate offences due to the lack of harm and therefore the more opaque 
or indirect conduct of the accused from which the prosecution attempts to infer the intention. 
In terrorist offences therefore, the label of ‘terrorist’ may facilitate the inference of intention. 
The aforementioned legal dilemma arising from the time lag between a crime being 
committed and a prosecution being initiated is compounded when applied to inchoate 
offences, and therefore the Supreme Court’s rebuke about relying on prosecutorial discretion 
to temper the broad definition of terrorism in section 1 is of particular relevance.  With 
regards to terrorist offences – and particularly inchoate offences – the label of ‘terrorist’ 
ought to act as a guide to the inference of this intention. It would follow that, as distinct from 
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the apparent ‘operational necessity’ for a broader definition, a more concise definition of 
terrorism for such inchoate offences would be necessary or helpful to enable the detection 
and surveillance of terrorist suspects at stages long before the contemplation of any 
prosecution.   
 
These rule of law concerns echoed in Gul may in turn lead to human rights concerns. The 
lack of clarity regarding whether one’s actions could amount to an inchoate offence could in 
turn constitute a breach of Convention principles. As already indicated, the ECtHR has 
stipulated on numerous occasions that a law ‘must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of 
any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise’.53 
That said, where the ordinary criminal law can accommodate an offence it is generally used 
by the DPP, even if such an offence would come within the ambit of the definition of 
terrorism under section 1. Anderson gives the examples of the four would-be bombers whose 
bombs failed to go off two weeks after the 7 July 2005 attacks being prosecuted for 
conspiracy to murder.
54
 Consequently, it would appear that defining terrorism is moot when it 
comes to prosecuting certain offences. This in turn raises the issue of the value of having a 
legal definition of terrorism in the first instance.  
 
B. Terrorism: a social construct? 
David Anderson states that ‘to review from first principles the definition of terrorism would 
require a root-and-branch review of the entire edifice of anti-terrorism law, based on a clear-
headed assessment of why and to what extent it is operationally necessary to supplement 
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established criminal laws and procedures’.55 The previous section suggested that having 
multiple different definitions of terrorism may be a better option than the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach captured by section 1 of the 2000 Act. However, an axiomatic issue raised by 
attempting to define terrorism – and particularly in a legalistic manner – is that it assumes 
that a phenomenon of terrorism actually exists. Furthermore, it also assumes that the 
definition is necessary in order to construct an adequate counter-terrorist response.  Indeed, 
multiple different definitions of terrorism would also question whether terrorism is actually a 
tangible construct. 
 
If the definition of terrorism results in ‘unusually wide discretions to all those concerned with 
the application of the counter-terrorism law’56 then it has failed in its function of correctly 
demarcating its scope. Leaving the assessment of whether an act is classified as terrorism to 
the discretion of officials is, as stated by the Supreme Court in Gul, antithetical to the rule of 
law which values such principles as clarity and certainty. If this definition of terrorism is so 
broad as to essentially leave the issue wholly up to the discretion of decision-makers, then in 
practical terms the outcome is no different than if terrorism is not defined at all. It creates a 
‘legal black hole’ where the discretion of the decision-maker cannot be questioned, leaving 
the definition of terrorism only as a facilitator of power rather than a constraint upon it.
57
  
 
The Supreme Court’s concern in Gul about the broad nature of the definition of terrorism in 
section 1 is not unique and nor are such criticisms applicable to section 1 alone. On a more 
conceptual level, Conor Gearty argues that terrorism is ‘an uncertain term with no shared 
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meaning’.58 Alex Schmid agrees, arguing that terrorism is used ‘promiscuously for such a 
wide range of manifestations… that one wonders whether it is a unitary concept.’59 Whether 
terrorism is a tangible phenomenon capable of objective extrapolation and categorisation is 
therefore highly problematic and controversial. As is evidenced by Gul, the lines between 
terrorist and civilian, terrorist and combatant, and terrorist and criminal are blurred, both by 
the individual labelled as terrorist and by the individual labelling him or her. Making the 
distinction between friend and enemy difficult benefits the ‘terrorist’ in a manner similar to 
partisan fighters: combatants who wear no discernible uniforms or symbols in order to launch 
surprise attacks on soldiers then retreat into ordinary society or the geographical 
background.
60
 The clandestine nature of these attackers facilitates the partisan’s and relatedly 
the terrorist’s evasion. The labeller, however, can also benefit from the existence of a 
clandestine foe. Such an enemy acts as a ‘folk devil’ against which society can unite. 
Institutions and individuals reliant upon democratic affirmation for their legitimacy can then 
utilise this ‘folk devil’ as a target of hate and, by proxy, cast themselves as the solution to 
such a problem, and profit electorally from this.
61
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This potential to profit electorally from targeting folk devils is well documented in academic 
literature.
62
 The independent reviewer of Terrorism Legislation David Anderson argues that 
the definition of terrorism is so wide as to encompass organised crime. Again, however, it is 
the operation of decision-maker discretion that has avoided this conflation, and this is not 
guaranteed. Nor, in light of Gul, can such discretion be a legal justification for an over-broad 
definition. For example, the hyperbolisation of organised crime into a threat to the state can 
be seen in Ireland where the jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court – a non-jury court 
initially established to deal with terrorist offences related to dissident Republicans – has been 
extended to encompass offences related to organised crime.
63
 The individuals convicted by 
the Special Criminal Court, by definition, present such a threat to the state that ‘the ordinary 
courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of 
public peace and order’.64 
 
The lack of international agreement around whether or not freedom fighters constitute 
terrorists – as alluded to by the Supreme Court in Gul – is illustrative of the intense political 
nature of such a labelling and the relevant interests at play in international attempts to 
construct a working definition of terrorism. Jorg Friedrichs argues that a state’s stance on 
whether such fighters constitute terrorists stems from where their requisite vested interests 
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lie.
65
 The UK, for example, prefers that they do come within the ambit of terrorism due to 
their past experience of confronting the threat posed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
66
 
In contrast, Islamic states tend to reject the idea of freedom fighters as terrorists in order to 
avoid designating Palestinian combatants with such a delegitimising and politically loaded 
label.
67
 
 
What is omnipresent, therefore, in various quests for a satisfactory definition of terrorism is 
the wholly subjective nature of this labelling, and consequently the intensely political nature 
of this decision. Introducing such a polemic term into the criminal justice system or the legal 
system as a whole therefore is extremely worrying from a human rights perspective.  
 
A. CONCLUSION 
In some respects, given the nature of the UK separation of powers and the Supreme Court’s 
position relative to the sovereignty of Parliament, the outcome of R v Gul is unsurprising. 
This is particularly so given that, unlike in R v F, no arguments were advanced by the 
appellant that relied upon the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998.
68
 However, through 
their forceful obiter dictum corroborated by opinions of the Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation David Anderson QC, the Supreme Court is sending a strong signal that 
the definition of terrorism in section 1 of the 2000 Act is unsatisfactory. The apparent 
difficulty alluded to by the Court – which is now for Parliament to tangle with should it 
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choose to do so – is how to refine this definition without hampering the apparent ‘operational 
necessity’ for a broad malleable definition which section 1 currently provides. Whether 
Parliament will actually undertake this challenge is, however, not certain as it is in the 
interests of the political branches to keep the definition of terrorism as vague and therefore as 
malleable as possible, unless such vagueness gives rise to compatibility issues with ECHR 
obligations. On a more metaphysical level, R v Gul may provide an additional string to the 
bows of those who question the existence of terrorism as a tangible phenomenon, instead 
considering it to be merely a ‘social construct’ that ‘tells us more about the categoriser than 
the categorised’.69 
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